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Abstract
This paper investigates two elements of agency costs, namely the wealth-
transfer and the value destruction problems, associated with the equity-conversion
and writedown CoCo bonds. By focussing on the costs as those stemming from
the deviation from absolute priority rule (DAPR), we derive the expressions for
the CoCo bonds and show that both agency costs are aggravated under these
structures. We demonstrate this by studying the case of Banca Monte dei Paschi
bail-out in 2013. We argue that the replacement of government bail-out by bond-
holder bail-in is akin to replacing moral hazard for agency costs, and that by
encouraging bail-in structures the regulator prioritises the reduction of the former
while ignoring the aggravation of the latter.
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1. Introduction
The new financial regulation, namely Basel III, will have a strong impact not only on
the nature of the banking business,1 but especially on the capital structure of the banks.
Amongst the new Basel III features,2 the new style of subordinate debt stands out the
most: the CoCo (Contingent Convertible) bonds. This is an intricate product which
is becoming in vogue in a low yielding environment, as investors rush into high yield
instruments, and banks take advantage of it by issuing a “cheap” (relative to the cost
of equity of the banks) equity-like instruments that helps bolstering the capital and
leverage ratios.3 However, the lack of standardisation4 and its complex nature means
that its impact on banks’ behaviour is not yet well understood.5
The aim of this paper is to investigate the main shortcomings of the new financial
regulation in general, and the CoCos in particular, which is the overlook of the impact
on the agency costs. Here two elements of agency costs are investigated. The first
is the wealth-transfer problem, where the equityholders have an incentive to take on
riskier projects because of the long option position held by them, and “sold” by the
guarantors - the government in the government bail-out case and the bondholders in the
bail-in cases. Higher volatility of the projects’ values means higher option value, leading
to wealth being transferred from the guarantors to the equityholders.6 The second is
1Banks retracting from high ROE but high RWA businesses, such as investment banking, structured
credit, etc.
2E.g. Leverage Ratio, Net Stable Funding Ratio, etc.
3See for example, “CoCo Bond Feeding Frenzy Sends Yields Tumbling”, The Financial Times, March
26, 2014.
4Such as equity conversion ratio, permanent/temporary writedowns/oﬀs, high/low trigger and the
embedded equity option (for equity conversion CoCos).
5See for example, “Regulators must act on coco bond risks”, The Financial Times, May 7, 2014.
6Basically, the buyer of an option is then able to determine the volatility of the underlying asset. If
this was possible in a financial market, then it would be an illegal market manipulation.
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the value destruction problem, where in a falling solvency scenario the equityholders
are tempted to “gamble-for-ressurection”, i.e. sacrifice value for higher volatility. We
investigate these as the unintended consequences of the deviation from absolute priority
rules (DAPR).7 Under the absolute priority rule (APR), bondholders should not bear
losses until equityholders have been wiped out. Since the banks are systemic entities,
the regulator has so far mostly rescued troubled banks (“bail-out”) to minimise market
disruptions and deposit runs, which have historically exacerbated the intrinsic moral
hazard of the banking industry. To tackle this, the new financial regulation advocates for
the bondholders to assume losses (“bail-in”) on a going concern basis (hence “deviation”
from APR). We agree that bail-in should replace bail-out as investors and not taxpayers
should bear the losses of their bad investments. From the shareholders’ standpoint there
is not much diﬀerence between the two: when the regulator deems the bank’s point of
non-viability (PONV) in a bail-out (the point at which a bail-out is triggered) at the
level where the CoCo triggers are set (7%) in a bail-in, the equityholders take the first
loss down to 7% Core Tier 1 (CT1), for either taxpayers (bail-out) or bondholders (bail-
in) to subsequently take any further losses to replenish the CT1 back to the pre-crisis
level. Our view is that in the bail-out there is an embedded moral hazard problem, while
in the bail-in there are agency costs that arises from the violation of the priority rule.
The new bail-in set-up therefore simply replaces the former with the latter.
So far the literature has focused on CoCo styles (Albul, Jaﬀee and Tchistyi, 2013;
Calomiris and Herring, 2011; Flannery, 2009; Glasserman and Nouri, 2012), triggers
7The DAPR has been magnified more recently by the introduction of the Maximum Distributible
Amount (MDA) that kicks in when the CT1 falls below the Combined Buﬀer (comprised by the Conser-
vation, Countercyciclical and Systemic Buﬀer) which forces the bank to suspend coupons and dividends
through a ratchet structure. The new Additionial Tier 1 (AT1) CoCos are coming with no dividend
pusher / stopper, meaning that banks can suspend CoCos coupons whilst still paying out dividends in
the event of the CT1 falling below the combined buﬀer.
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(Prescott, 2011) and valuation (Pennachi, 2010). Others such as Berg and Kaserer
(2011) have highlighted the potential perverse incentives that can dissuade shareholders
from taking preemptive actions in a falling solvency scenario. They indirectly touch
upon the agency cost of CoCo to discuss the potential over-investment problem that
can stem from the increasing vega of the embedded option. They derive expressions
for “Convert-to-surrender CoCo” and “Convert-to-steal CoCo” which are essentially the
CoCo and the Writedown bonds investigated here. However they assume immediate
full conversion of the bonds, while we allow for partial conversions and investigate the
structures as those specifically implementing DAPR. Eberhart and Senbet (1993) also
investigates the role of APR violation, but they assume the wealth-transfer to be a
constant proportion of the firm value. Here we derive explicitly the values of the DAPR-
induced wealth-transfer. This allows us to analytically demonstrate, first, that the vega
of the equityholders’ position increases with the level of CoCo bond as a proportion of
the total debt (the wealth-transfer problem), and second, that “gamble-for-ressurection”
is a compelling option for the bank (the value destruction problem). We argue that the
latter leads to the bank straying from the Capital Market Line (CML) in the Capital
Asset Pricing Model, in order to pursue low Sharpe Ratio projects at the expense of
bondholders. This, we demonstrate, in a case study of the 2013 bail-out of Banca Monte
dei Paschi di Siena. Finally, our analysis extends Moraux and Navatte’s (2009) work
on “admissible” debt-to-equity swap (DES), and show that the CoCo structure is a
non-admissible DES. This is because its terms of restructuring are pre-set in advance,
preventing bondholders from seeking a swap that somewhat compensates them for the
forgiven debt related losses. This is shown to lead to higher agency costs for CoCo bail-in
compared to the traditional DES. Overall, unlike the existing literature, our stress is on
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the point that by encouraging bail-in structures, the regulator prioritises the reduction
of moral hazard while ignoring the aggravation of the agency costs.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we describe comprehensively the
four structures under comparison: no bail-out/bail-in, government bail-out, bail-in with
CoCo bonds and with Writedown bonds. We show that in the bail-in cases, the DAPR
inherent in the structures can be valued as “condor-like” structures8 held by the equi-
tyholders. This allows us to derive expressions for the prices of the bail-in bonds. In
Section 3, we dwell on the wealth-transfer element of the agency cost demonstrated by
the rising vega of the equityholders’ positions. We also identify the regulators’ problem
of a trade-oﬀ between banks’ safety and the wealth-transfer agency cost. In Section 4,
we show that bailing-in increases the value destruction incentive of the equityholders,
represented by the falling delta-vega ratio of the equityholders’ positions. In Section
5, we compare the CoCo bail-in structure with the traditional DES. In Section 6, we
demonstrate our results in Section 4 by studying the case of Banca Monte dei Paschi
bail-out in 2013. Finally in Section 7, we give concluding remarks.
2. Comparison of Structures
We investigate the agency costs in the following four cases:
1. No bail-out/bail-in
2. Government bail-out
3. Bail-in with CoCo bonds
4. Bail-in with Writedown bonds
8A condor is created by a combination of either a bull call spread with a bear call spread, or a bull
put spread with a bear put spread.
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Much of the analysis will be focussed on the CoCo bond. We consider a simple
firm financed by equity capital and discount bonds with maturity T . The total face
value of the bonds is F , which may include CoCo (face value FC) or Writedown (FW )
bonds. The face value of the remaining straight bond is FB. Therefore the firm can
either have F = FB (no bail-out/in or government bail-out), F = FB + FC (CoCo
bail-in) or F = FB + FW (Writedown bail-in). The total asset value at time T is
VT = DT +ET , where DT and ET represent the stakeholders’ (i.e. the debtholders’ and
the equityholders’) shares of VT . The bail-in bonds trigger at the capital ratio of τ . In
line with the reality, we set a minimum capital ratio of E which the regulators insist on
after a trigger has occurred. Similarly, in a bail-out where the government ends up with
some preference shares, we set a minimum common equity floor of EC .
In this section, for each of the above cases we derive the stakeholders’ payoﬀs at
time T as a function of VT , and their present values using the Merton (1974) framework
given the asset volatility, σ. The derivation details are given in Appendix A, where, for
demonstration purpose, we consider a representative firm with the following parameter
values when relevant: F = 90, FC = 20, FW = 20, τ = 7%, E = 10% and EC = 5%.
2.1. No Bail-out / Bail-in
It is well established in the literature that, without any possibilities of a bail-out/in the
equityholders hold a long call option at strike price F , while the bondholders’ position
is the bond minus a put option of the same strike price. Their payoﬀs are then,
PayOffND = min [VT , F ]
PayOffNE = max [VT − F, 0] .
(1)
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Figure 1: No Bail-out / Bail-in: F = 90
Fig.1 depicts the payoﬀs for the example with F = 90 as analysed in Appendix A.1.
The Merton valuation of the debt and equity holdings at time t = 0 are,
V ND = Fe
−rT − P (F )
V NE = C (F )
(2)
where C (K) and P (K) are the prices of call and put options with strike price K,
C (K) = V0N (d1 (K))−Ke−rTN (d2 (K))
P (K) = −V0N (−d1 (K)) +Ke−rTN (−d2 (K))
with d1 (K) =
ln(V0K )+

r+σ
2
2

T
σ
√
T
, d2 (K) = d1 − σ
√
T
(3)
and r is the risk-free rate, T is the bond’s time to maturity and σ is the asset volatility.
2.2. Government Bail-out
The government bail-out comes in twofold. First, the balance sheet is restored to main-
tain the minimum capital ratio E. With the debtholders fully protected at their face
value F , the balance sheet has a floor level of F
1−E . When the firm’s value VT falls below
7
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Figure 2: Government Bail-out: F = 90, E = 10%, EC = 5%
this, a bail-out is initiated in the form of an injection of preference shares held by the
government. Secondly for values of VT below F + F1−EEC, the government also ensures
a minimum common equity floor of EC. With the equityholders no longer bearing the
loss, the taxpayers provide the shortfall VT −
³
F + F
1−EEC
´
. The payoﬀs at T for the
debtholders, the equityholders and the government for its preference shares are,
PayOffBOD = F
PayOffBOE = max
h
VT − F, F1−EEC
i
PayOffBOEP = max
h
F
1−E − VT , 0
i
−max
h³
F + F
1−EEC
´
− VT , 0
i
.
(4)
The payoﬀs of the debtholders and the equityholders for the example firm in Appendix
A.2 are depicted in Fig.2. The present values of the debt and equity holdings are,
V BOD = Fe
−rT
V BOE =
FEC
1−E e
−rT + C
³
F + FEC
1−E
´
,
(5)
with C (K) as given in Eq.(3). When EC = 0 we recover V NE in Eq.(2) for the equity-
holders, while the debtholders still benefit from the government guarantee.
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2.3. Bail-in with CoCo Bonds
We now investigate the CoCo bond bail-in structure in detail. In contrast to the common
practice in the literature, here we allow partial conversion of the bond. The debt F
consists of FC of CoCo bond and FB of straight bond. The bail-in triggers when the
equity capital ratio, VT−FVT , falls below the trigger rate τ , or when VT ≤
F
1−τ . Initially,
as with the government bail-out, the bail-in ensures that the minimum capital ratio
E ≥ τ is reattained. For FB
1−E ≤ VT ≤
F
1−τ this means that, of (1−E)VT of the liability,
(1−E)VT − FB remains as the unconverted portion of the CoCo bond. Thus FC −
[(1−E)VT − FB] of the CoCo bond is converted into ED = (E − τ)VT of equity held
by the debtholders. This results in their loss of (E − τ)VT−{FC − [(1−E)VT − FB]} =
F − (1− τ)VT . For VT < FB1−E , the minimum capital ratio E is unattainable even with
a full conversion of the CoCo bond. Assuming no outsider capital injection or forced
conversion of the straight bond,9 for FB
1−τ ≤ VT <
FB
1−E the entire CoCo bond is converted
into ED = (1− τ)VT − FB of equity held by the debtholders, while the equityholders
maintain EC = τVT of equity. For VT below FB1−τ , the CoCo bondholders are totally wiped
out (ED = 0) and the equityholders’ holding is written down. Finally when VT < FB
the firm becomes insolvent and the straight bond holders become the residual claimant.
The details are given in the Appendix A.3. The payoﬀs, which for debtholders is the
total of straight and CoCo bonds plus their equity, are,
PayOffCD = min [F, (1− τ)VT ] + max [FB − (1− τ)VT , 0]−max [FB − VT , 0]
PayOffCE = max [VT − F, τVT ]−max [FB − (1− τ)VT , 0] + max [FB − VT , 0] .
(6)
9In reality burden sharing may occur, where the straight bonds are forced to convert or written down
to attain the minimum capital ratio E.
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Figure 3: Bail-in with τ = 7%, E = 10%, F = 90 and (a) FC = 20, (b) FC = 0
Fig.3 shows the payoﬀs for our example firm. Their present values are,
V CD = Fe−rT − (1− τ)P
¡
F
1−τ
¢
+ (1− τ)P
¡ FB
1−τ
¢
− P (FB)
V CE = τV0 + (1− τ)C
¡
F
1−τ
¢
− (1− τ)P
¡ FB
1−τ
¢
+ P (FB) .
(7)
We recover V ND and V NE when τ = FC = 0. V CE derived in Eq.(7) diﬀers from the
expression derived for “Convert-to-surrender CoCo” in Berg and Kaserer (2011) in two
ways. First, they assume 100% conversion of the CoCo bond when triggered. Here we
allow partial conversion. Second, they assume the whole liability to be CoCo bonds,
i.e. the equityholders are never wiped out for VT > 0. Here our assumption of FC < F
means that once the CoCo bond is wiped out, the normal absolute priority rule (APR)
resumes where the equityholders’ holdings are written down ahead of the straight bonds.
One way of viewing the CoCo bail-in eﬀect is to regard the diﬀerence between V CE in
Eq.(7) and V NE in Eq.(2) as the wealth-transfer induced by the introduction of deviation
from absolute priority rule (DAPR). In Fig.3, this is the area between the EC payoﬀs
for FC = 0 and FC = 20. Eberhart and Senbet (1993) also investigates the role of APR
violations in reducing agency conflicts between bondholders and shareholders. However
10
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Figure 4: CoCo Condor with FB = 70, FC = 20 and τ = 7%
they assume the wealth-transfer to be a constant proportion of the firm value, and argue
that when the firm is in distress the negative vega of the assumed wealth-transfer partly
oﬀsets the positive vega of the equityholders’ position, hence mitigating the agency cost
incentive. Here we are able to explicitly derive the amount of DAPR-induced wealth-
transfer as V CE − V NE . To do this, first use the put-call parity relation to re-express V CE
in Eq.(7) as,
V CE = C (F ) +
∙
(1− τ)P
µ
F
1− τ
¶
− P (F )
¸
−
∙
(1− τ)P
µ
FB
1− τ
¶
− P (FB)
¸
. (8)
Comparing this to the no bail-out/in V NE in Eq.(2), we can first see that the equityholders
payoﬀ is improved by a bear spread-like protection, (1− τ)P
¡
F
1−τ
¢
− P (F ). This rep-
resents the DAPR induced by the introduction of the CoCo bond. The bull spread-like
structure −
£
(1− τ)P
¡ FB
1−τ
¢
− P (FB)
¤
then reinstates the APR once the CoCo bond is
wiped out. Together they create a “condor-like” structure, which we will call the “CoCo
condor”, depicted in Fig.4. Below we argue that for values of FC suﬃciently large, the
vega of this CoCo condor increases as the firm approaches its distress level, hence fur-
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ther aggravating the wealth-transfer incentive. Note it may be likely that in reality, in
the extreme case that the CoCo bonds are totally wiped out, the regulator will step in
and enforce either the writedown of the remaining straight bonds or a debt-to-equity
swap. In such cases the APR bull spread does not exist, and instead of the condor-like
structure we have a CoCo bear spread reflecting just the DAPR.
As shown in Fig.5 the payoﬀ of the CoCo bond has a discontinuous drop at τ ,
PayOffFC = FC −
E − τ
1− EFχVT< F1−τ
− (1−E)max
∙
F
1− τ − VT , 0
¸
+ (1−E)max
∙
FB
1−E − VT , 0
¸
,
where χVT< F1−τ =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1 , VT< F1−τ
0 , VT≥ F1−τ
is an indicator function. Then,
Proposition 1 (CoCo Bond Price) When the total bond issued by the firm is F , the
price of the zero coupon CoCo bond with face value FC, maturity T , trigger capital ratio
τ and regulatory minimum capital ratio E is,
CC0 = FCe−rT −
µ
E − τ
1− EF
¶
BP
µ
F
1− τ
¶
− (1−E)P
µ
F
1− τ
¶
+ (1−E)P
µ
FB
1−E
¶
(9)
where BP (K) is the price of the binary put option with unit payout at strike K,
BP (K) = e−rTN (−d2 (K)) , (10)
P (K) is the put option price given by Eq.(3).
We can immediately see from Eq.(9) that, in defining δ = VT−FVT − τ as the “distance-
12
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Figure 5: CoCo bond payoﬀ with τ = 7%, E = 10%, FC = 20 and F = 90
to-trigger”, then ∂CC0∂VT > 0 (positive delta) and
∂VT
∂δ > 0 imply
∂CC0
∂δ > 0, suggesting that
the larger the distance-to-trigger, the higher the value of the CoCo bond.
2.4. Bail-in with Writedown Bonds
Finally, we consider Writedown bonds, where the debtholders hold face value FB of
straight bonds and FW of the Writedown bonds, where F = FB + FW . As with the
CoCo bail-in, the Writedown bail-in triggers once VT ≤ F1−τ . The entire Writedown
bond is then writtendown/oﬀ (temporarily or permanently). The payoﬀs are, where for
bondholders it is the total of straight and Writedown bonds,
PayOffWD = min [VT , FB] + FWχVT> F1−τ
PayOffWEC = max [VT − FB, 0]− FWχVT> F1−τ .
(11)
Again χVT> F1−τ is an indicator function. Fig.6 depicts the payoﬀs of the example given
in Appendix A.4. The present values of the debt and equity holdings are,
V WD = FBe−rT − P (FB) + FWBC
¡
F
1−τ
¢
V WE = C (FB)− FWBC
¡
F
1−τ
¢ (12)
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Figure 6: Write-down: FB = 70, FW = 20, τ = 7% and E = 10%.
where BC (K) is the unit binary call option with strike price K, given by,
BC (K) = e−rTN (d2 (K)) . (13)
V WE in Eq.(12) is the same as the expression for “Convert-to-steal CoCo” in Berg and
Kaserer (2011), with the additional specification that the trigger point is at F
1−τ .
Analogous to the CoCo bail-in analysis, V WE can be re-expressed as,
V WE = C (F ) + FWBP
µ
F
1− τ
¶
− [P (F )− P (FB)] . (14)
As before the extra option positions compared to V NE in Eq.(2) can be interpreted as the
DAPR binary put and the APR bull spread, resulting in a Writedown condor position
as shown in Fig.7.10 We argue below that the positive vega of this condor for suﬃciently
large values of FW aggravates the agency costs. Again in reality it may be likely that the
regulators would enforce writedown of the remaining straight bond once the Writedown
10The fact that here the DAPR structure is a put binary option rather than a bear spread, as was in
the CoCo bail-in case, stems from the fact that we assume a 100% writedown of the Writedown bond
once it is triggered. In contrast we assumed a partial conversion with the CoCo bond.
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Figure 7: Writedown Condor with FB = 70, FW = 20 and τ = 7%
bond is wiped out. In this case the APR bull spread would be forfeited, resulting in a
Writedown binary put rather than the condor above.
The Writedown bond payoﬀ is that of a binary call:
PayOffW = FWχVT> F1−τ .
Proposition 2 (Writedown Bond Price) When the total bond issued by the firm is
F , the price of the zero coupon Writedown bond with face value FW , maturity T and
trigger capital ratio τ is,
WD0 = FWBC
µ
F
1− τ
¶
.
where BC (K) is the unit binary call option price given by Eq.(13).
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3. Agency Cost: Wealth-Transfer Problem
We distinguish two types of agency costs associated with the over-investment problems
in bail-out / in structures:
1. Wealth-transfer problem. This is when the equityholders have an incentive for
higher risk-taking, normally represented by the vega of their option position.
2. Value-destruction. Eberhart and Senbet (1993) state, “Risk-shifting can enhance
equity value even when higher risk projects are of lower value, implying that in-
vestment decisions can be distorted away from firm value maximisation.” When
negative NPV projects are still beneficial to the equityholders due to their convex
payoﬀ and the project’s higher volatility, the reduction in the firm’s total value
represents this type of agency cost.
We investigate these in turn in this section and the next. For the purpose of the
technical analyses, we assume r > σ
2
2
for the remainder of the paper.
As common in the literature (e.g. Eberhart and Senbet, 1993; Berg and Kaserer,
2011), we investigate the vega of the equityholder position as a measure of their incentive
to take on riskier projects. The vegas for each of the above cases are,
V egaNE = V0
√
TN 0 (d1 (F ))
V egaBOE = V0
√
TN 0
³
d1
³
F + FEC
1−E
´´
V egaCE = V0
√
T
£
(1− τ)N 0
¡
d1
¡
F
1−τ
¢¢
− (1− τ)N 0
¡
d1
¡ FB
1−τ
¢¢
+N 0 (d1 (FB))
¤
V egaWE = V0
√
TN 0 (d1 (FB)) + 1σd1
¡
F
1−τ
¢
FWe−rTN 0
¡
d2
¡
F
1−τ
¢¢
(15)
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Figure 8: Vega vs V0 when F = 90, FC = FW = 20, τ = 7% and E = 10%
where N 0 (d1 (K)) = 1√2πe
− [d1(K)]
2
2 for strike K. These are depicted in Fig.8. The graph
compares the incentives for the equityholders to take on riskier projects at diﬀerent
values of V0 between the four structures. Several observations can be made:
1. With no bail-out or bail-in, the incentive for higher risk taking increases as the
firm’s asset value falls towards the critical value F .
In Fig.8 the critical value for no bail-out/in is F = 90. This basically states
that the vega of a call option increases as the option approaches at-the-money
(ATM). More technically, the no bail-out/in vega curve is quasi-concave, as e−x2 is
a quasi-concave function and d1 (F ) is a monotonically increasing function of V0.
Its maximum occurs at,
∂V egaNE
∂V0
= −1
σ
d2 (F )N 0 (d1 (F )) = 0⇔ V0 = Fe−

r−σ2
2

T . (16)
∂V ega
∂V0
, sometimes called the vanna, is negative for V0 > Fe
−

r−σ
2
2

T , or V egaNE
increases as V0 falls towards F (and unambiguously so for r > σ
2
2
). The wealth-
transfer happens when the equityholders choose higher σ projects, resulting in an
17
increase in the value of their call option, and an equal fall in the value of the
debtholders’ position due to the rise in the value of their short put option.
2. For the asset value above the trigger point, the risk-taking incentive is higher for
the government bail-out case than for the no bail-out/in case.
In Fig.8 the trigger point for the government bail-out is F
1−E = 100. Compare the
vegas for the bail-out and no bail-out/in cases: V egaBOE > V ega
N
E if and only if,
N 0
µ
d1
µ
F +
FEC
1−E
¶¶
> N 0 (d1 (F ))⇔ V0 > F
µ
1 +
EC
1−E
¶ 1
2
e−

r+σ
2
2

T .
The trigger point F
1−E is strictly greater than F
³
1 +
EC
1−E
´ 1
2
e−

r+σ
2
2

T ,11 and hence
the statement is proved. Intuitively the existence of the minimum capital ratio EC
shifts higher the strike price of the equityholders’ call option by a factor
³
1 +
EC
1−E
´
.
Hence for values V0 ≥ F1−E the call option is closer to ATM than in the no bail-
out/in case, resulting in a higher vega. Note here with the debtholders’ holdings
protected at V BOD = Fe
−rT , the wealth-transfer is from the government (and ulti-
mately the taxpayers) to the equityholders.
3. For the asset value above the trigger point the risk-taking incentive increases with
the level of CoCo bond: the incentive is lower than that of the no bail-in/out case
for low levels of the CoCo bond, and higher for high levels of the CoCo bond.
In Fig.8, the trigger point for the CoCo bail-in is F
1−τ = 96.77. As was shown
in Section 2.3, issuing of CoCo bond results in an additional long CoCo condor
11It suﬃces to show that F1−E > F
³
1 +
EC
1−E
´ 1
2
. This is true when 11−E >
³
1−E+EC
1−E
´ 1
2 ⇔ 1 >¡
1−E +EC
¢
(1−E), which is true as E ≥ EC .
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Figure 9: (a) DAPR Bear Spread and (b) APR Bull Spread, with FB = 70, FC = 20
and τ = 7%
position for the equityholders. As explained this condor is constructed by a DAPR
bear spread and an APR bull spread. Fig.9 shows the vega of these respectively.
The strike prices of the DAPR bear spread are F
1−τ = 96.77 (i.e. the trigger point)
and F = 90, while those of the APR bull spread are FB
1−τ = 75.27 and FB = 70. As
depicted, at the trigger point the vega of the DAPR bear spread is positive, while
that of the APR bull spread is negative. When the level of CoCo bond FC is small
(i.e. FB is closer to F ), latter more than oﬀsets the former, making the vega of the
CoCo condor close to the trigger point negative. This makes the net vega of the
equityholders’ position (call option plus the CoCo condor) less than that in the no
bail-out/in case. At a higher level of CoCo bond the bull spread is more out-of-the-
money (OTM), resulting in the CoCo condor vega becoming positive at and above
the trigger point, as depicted in Fig.10, and increasingly so as FC is increased.
This implies a higher incentive for risk-taking for the equityholders than in the no
bail-out/in case. In summary, there is therefore a trade-oﬀ between the safety of
the banks, achieved by a higher proportion of the debt made up by CoCo bonds,
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Figure 10: CoCo Condor with FB = 70, FC = 20 and τ = 7%
and the higher agency cost, which is the incentive for higher risk-taking. This is an
issue we believe so far has not been considered by the regulators. Finally note, if
in reality, the regulator forces writedown of straight bonds when the CoCo bonds
are wiped out, then with no APR bull spread the vega increase, and hence the
higher agency cost, at and above the trigger point is unambiguous for all values of
FC.
4. For the asset value above the trigger point the risk-taking incentive increases with
the level of Writedown bond: the incentive is lower than that of the no bail-in/out
case for low levels of the Writedown bond, and higher for high levels of the bond.
This is analogous to the CoCo case. As shown in Fig.11 the vega of the DAPR
put binary is positive around and above the trigger point ( F
1−τ = 96.77) while that
of the APR bull spread is negative. When FW is small the latter dominates the
former making the net vega of the Writedown condor negative at the trigger point,
while for larger FW the net vega becomes positive as depicted in Fig.12. This again
implies a trade-oﬀ between the bank’s safety and the higher agency cost which the
20
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Figure 11: (a) DAPR Put Binary and (b) APR Bull Spread, with FB = 70, FW = 20
and τ = 7%
regulator must consider. As with the CoCo case, if the regulator enforces violation
of APR beyond that provided by the Writedown bond, then the increase in the
agency cost is again unambiguous for all values of FW .
To conclude, with suﬃciently large CoCo orWritedown bonds the incentive for higher
risk-taking is increased, exacerbating the wealth-transfer element of the agency cost.
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Figure 12: Writedown Condor with FB = 70, FW = 20 and τ = 7%
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4. Value Destruction
Value destruction agency cost occurs when the equityholders do not follow value maximi-
sation for the firm. This is a Principal-Agent problem where the interest of the decision
makers (the equityholders) does not align with that of the firm.
To investigate this, let there be a discrete set of projects defined by their expected
outcome E [V iT ] and the return volatility σ
i. Let the market price of risk be λ. Then the
present value of each project is,
V i0 = e
−riTE
£
V iT
¤
, where ri = rf + λσi (17)
where ri is the required rate of return of project i and rf is the risk-free rate. Under
value maximisation the firm would choose project m such that,
V m0 = max
©
V i0
ª
.
On the other hand, under no bail-out the equityholders project mN such that,
V m
N
0 = max
©
V NE
¡
V i0
¢ª
, where V NE
¡
V i0
¢
= C
¡
V i0 , F, σ
i¢
with C (.) as given in Eq.(2), where the arguments now also specify the underlying asset
value and its volatility as well as its strike price. WhenmN 6= m, V mN0 < V m0 , and hence
there is value destruction.
The value destruction problem arises from the fact that the firm value depends on
the spot value (estimated as the present value in Eq.(17)), but not on the asset volatility
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beyond its eﬀect on the required rate of return ri, while for the equityholders their
value increases with higher σ. Value destruction results when the reduction in the
equityholders’ value due to the lower spot asset value (the delta eﬀect) is more than
oﬀset by the increase in the value due to the higher volatility (the vega eﬀect). The
degree of this eﬀect can therefore be represented by the relative size of the two, which
we denote η:
η =
∆
V ega
.
The smaller the η of the structure, the more likely there will be value destruction.
We now make the following observations:
1. For the asset value above the trigger point, the value destruction is more likely for
the government bail-out case than for the no bail-out case.
Compare the delta of the two structures:
∆NE = N (d1 (F )) > ∆
BO
E = N
µ
d1
µ
F +
FEC
1−E
¶¶
, ∀V0. (18)
We have already established that for V0 > F1−E , V ega
N
E < V ega
BO
E . Hence η
N >
ηBO above the trigger point.
2. The value destruction is more likely for CoCo bail-in than for no bail-out for suf-
ficiently high levels of CoCo bond.
Given the CoCo condor
CCcdr =
∙
(1− τ)P
µ
F
1− τ
¶
− P (F )
¸
−
∙
(1− τ)P
µ
FB
1− τ
¶
− P (FB)
¸
, (19)
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the delta of this is,
∆CCcdr =
∙
N (−d1 (F ))− (1− τ)N
µ
−d1
µ
F
1− τ
¶¶¸
−
∙
N (−d1 (FB))− (1− τ)N
µ
−d1
µ
FB
1− τ
¶¶¸
. (20)
The suﬃcient condition for ∂∂K
£
N (−d1 (K))− λN
¡
−d1
¡
K
λ
¢¢¤
< 0when λ ∈ (0, 1)
is that V0 > Kλ (see Appendix B). Thus for V0 >
F
1−τ , ∆CCcdr < 0. This can also
be seen from the downward-sloping PV curve in Fig.10. Hence ∆CE < ∆NE above
the trigger point. As V egaCE > V ega
N
E for suﬃciently large values of FC (shown
before), this implies that ηN > ηC for those values of FC. Intuitively, CoCo bail-in
aggravates the value destruction agency cost through two channels: by decreasing
the benefit to the equityholders of a higher firm value (decreased delta), while also
increasing their benefit of a higher volatility (increased vega). However, where the
regulator enforces DAPR beyond that provided by CoCo, the value destruction
problem is worse than in no bail-out/in case for all values of FC unambiguously.
3. The value destruction can be large for Writedown bail-in for larger face values of
Writedown bonds.
Given the Writedown condor
WDcdr = FWBP
µ
F
1− τ
¶
− [P (F )− P (FB)] , (21)
the delta of this is,
∆WDcdr = −
FWe−rT
V0σ
√
T
N 0
µ
−d2
µ
F
1− τ
¶¶
+ [N (−d1 (F ))−N (−d1 (FB))] . (22)
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Figure 13: Delta vs V0 when F = 90, FC = FW = 70 and τ = 7%
In Appendix C we prove that this is negative for V0 > F1−τ , which is also shown
in Fig.10 by the downward-sloping PV curve. Hence ∆WE < ∆NE above the trigger
point. As we know that V egaWE > V ega
N
E for suﬃciently large FW , this implies
that ηN > ηW for those values of FW . Thus Writedown bail-in also aggravates
the value destruction agency cost via both decreasing delta and increasing vega.
Furthermore, in this case for larger values of FW , ∆WE can turn negative (see Fig.13
where FW = 70). This is an extreme outcome where the equityholders are better
oﬀ destroying the value of the firm even without the benefit from higher volatility.
To conclude, not only do introduction of CoCo or Writedown bonds increase the
incentive for wealth-transfer by increasing the vega of the equityholders’ position as
described in Section 3, we have established in this section that it also increases the
incentive for value destruction by decreasing the delta, hence aggravating the delta-
vega ratio η (i.e. higher incentive to sacrifice value in order to “gamble-for-resurrect”).
This result may be observable in reality if banks deliberately opt for low Sharpe Ratio
investments: a case study showing this is given in Section 6.
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5. CoCo Bond as Non-admissible Debt-to-Equity Swap
In the above sections we concluded that the CoCo andWritedown bond bail-in structures
have inherently higher agency costs than under no bail-out/in. However, in reality banks
are rarely allowed to become insolvent, with restructuring occurring long before the asset
value is allowed to fall below F . Here we consider one of those possibilities, the debt-to-
equity swap (DES), and compare this with the CoCo bail-in structure.
We begin with a detailed investigation of the DES structure. The framework is
an extension of Moraux and Navatte (2009) (MN here onwards). As before a firm is
financed by equity and a zero coupon bond with maturity T and face value F . Under
normal APR the payoﬀs at T for the debt and equityholders are similar to Eq.(1), with
an additional feature of bankruptcy costs of a proportion 1−β ∈ (0, 1] of the asset value
VT . Then the debtholders’ payoﬀ when there is no DES is,
PayOffND =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
F , if VT ≥ F
βVT , if VT < F
.
The existence of the bankruptcy cost means that there is a gain from restructuring,
which the stakeholders can share. In a DES the debtholders rescue the equityholders
by: (i) extending the existing debt by further s years to S = T + s at rate r, and (ii)
forgiving an amount A ∈ [0, F ] of the debt while receiving a proportion θ ∈ [0, 1] of
the firm’s equity in exchange. As extreme examples, θ = 0 with A > 0 means that the
debtholders forgive part or all of the debt with no equity in return, while θ = 1 means
that they expropriate current equityholders. As with MN we assume that debtholders
control the financial restructuring but with no intent to take over the firm, i.e. θ < 1. In
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contrast to MN, which assumes that the DES only kicks in when VT < F , we assume that
DES is enforced by the regulator at the point of non-viability (PONV), which reflects
the reality more. This level is further assumed to be the same as the bail-in trigger point
τ in the previous sections. Hence DES is implemented when VT ≤ F1−τ . Post-DES, at
the new bond maturity S the face value of the debt is (F −A) ers.12 For VT > F1−τ when
there is no DES, the debt is assumed to roll over to S with the new face value FerS.
For simplicity we assume there to be no debt restructuring at S irrespective of the asset
value VS at time S.13 The table below summarises the stakeholders’ holdings at S for
the diﬀerent cases:
VT range VS range and the payoﬀs¡
F
1−τ ,∞
¤ VS ≥ Fers : DS = Fers, ES = VS − Fers
VS < Fers : DS = βVS, ES = 0£
0, F
1−τ
¤ VS ≥ (F −A) ers : DS = (F −A) ers + θ [VS − (F −A) ers]ES = (1− θ) [VS − (F −A) ers]
VS < (F −A) ers : DS = βVS, ES = 0.
(23)
The expected present value at time T of the stakeholders’ payoﬀs at time S can now
be calculated. When there is no DES at T , these are,
DNoDEST = e−rs bET £FersχVS≥Fers + βVSχVS<Fers¤
= βVTN (−d1 (Fers)) + FN (d2 (Fers))
ENoDEST = e−rs bET £(VS − Fers)χVS≥Fers¤
= VTN (d1 (Fers))− FN (d2 (Fers)) ,
(24)
12This diﬀers from MN, who seem to assume that the repayment for the remaining debt F − A is
simply postponed until S with zero interest cost. The problem with this assumption is that, ceteris
paribus, the debtholders would always want an immediate redemption.
13This can be an extension to this analysis. Especially in the case that VT ≥ F1−τ at T , it seems
reasonable to allow DES at S when VS < Fe
rs
1−τ , even if we rule out repeated restructuring for the case
of VT < F1−τ and VS <
(F−A)ers
1−τ .
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where bET [ ] is the risk-neutral expectation taken at time T , χ is again the indicator
function and as before,
d1 (K) =
ln
¡VT
K
¢
+
³
r + σ
2
2
´
s
σ
√
s
and d2 (K) = d1 (K)− σ
√
s. (25)
Similarly when DES is triggered,
DDEST = e−rs bET £{(F −A) ers + θ [VS − (F −A) ers]}χVS≥(F−A)ers + βVSχVS<(F−A)ers¤
= βVT + (θ − β)VTN (d1 ((F −A) ers)) + (1− θ) (F −A)N (d2 ((F −A) ers))
EDEST = e
−rs bET £(1− θ) [VS − (F −A) ers]χVS≥(F−A)ers¤
= (1− θ) [VTN (d1 ((F −A) ers))− (F −A)N (d2 ((F −A) ers))] .
(26)
Note as a special case, when s→∞, DDES = βVT +(θ − β)VT , i.e. for a very long term
investment the creditors are incited to swap debt for equity only when θ > β.
The restructuring problem is a choice of three parameters: the amount of debt for-
given, A, the proportion of equity received, θ, and the term to maturity of the rescheduled
bond, s. With the debtholders controlling the financial restructuring, their problem is
that of maximising their wealth with the choice of (A, θ, s). The equityholders are always
better oﬀ with the DES for θ < 1, as they will receive a strictly positive claim instead
of the zero value that would result from bankruptcy.
First consider the socially optimal outcome. This is where the total present value of
the firm is maximised:
max
A,s
e−rs bET [VS] = βVT + (1− β)VTN ¡d1 ¡(F −A) e−rs¢¢ . (27)
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The second term is the net gain of restructuring, which would then be shared between
the stakeholders. Eq.(27) is monotonically increasing in A for any given s, and thus the
first-best is attained at A∗ = F . This is intuitive: a strictly positive value of F − A
implies a strictly positive probability of insolvency at the new maturity S; given the
non-zero restructuring cost β this reduces the present value of the firm; hence the firm
value is maximised at A = F where the future insolvency probability is zero. Then
comparing Eq.(27) with DDEST in Eq.(26) reveals that the socially optimal outcome can
be implemented by the choice θ∗ = 1. Thus any equilibrium outcome with θ∗ ∈ (0, 1)
would be second-best. However,
Proposition 3 When the debtholders have the full bargaining power, their optimal strat-
egy is the full takeover of the firm, (A, θ) = (F, 1).
Proof. Consider the following derivatives of DDEST :
∂DDEST
∂θ = VTN (d1 ((F −A) ers))− (F −A)N (d2 ((F −A) ers)) > 0 ∀θ∀A
∂DDEST
∂A =
(1−β)
σ
√
s N
0 (d2 ((F −A) ers))− (1− θ)N (d2 ((F −A) ers)) .
(28)
The monotonicity of ∂D
DES
T
∂θ is not surprising; whilst A determines the future default
probability, and hence the present value of the firm, θ simply determines the stakeholders’
shares of it. Therefore for any levels of A the debtholders would prefer the full transfer
θ∗ (A) = 1.14 The second derivative suggests that there are two opposing eﬀects of an
increase in A on the value of DDEST : an increase in A increases the total value of the
firm by decreasing the probability of future default, but it also decreases the face value
of the debt holding. Now suppose that the optimal outcome is (A∗, θ∗) with A∗ < F and
14Similarly, ∂E
DES
T
∂θ < 0 ∀θ∀A implies that the equityholders would always prefer θ
∗ (A) = 0.
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Figure 14: Indiﬀerence Curves for Equityholders and Debtholders: VT = 70, F = 90,
r = 6%, σ = 20%, s = 2 and β = 0.8
θ∗ < 1. However this outcome is not stable, as we know that θ∗ (A) = 1 ∀A. At θ = 1,
∂DDEST
∂A > 0, and the debtholders will optimally choose A = F where D
DES
T = VT . This
is the only stable outcome.
Note the choice of s is then irrelevant. This is the socially optimal outcome discussed
above. This result can also be seen diagrammatically by the use of indiﬀerence curves
(ICs). Consider the following derivatives of EDEST :
∂EDEST
∂θ = − [VTN (d1 ((F −A) ers))− (F −A)N (d2 ((F −A) ers))] < 0 ∀θ∀A
∂EDEST
∂A = (1− θ)N (d2 ((F −A) ers)) > 0 ∀θ∀A.
(29)
Thus for equityholders there is a simple trade-oﬀ between A and θ. Then on a θ − A
plane, their ICs are upward-sloping. For debtholders, their ICs are downward-sloping for
lower values of A where ∂D
DES
T
∂A > 0, while they turn upward-sloping for larger values of A.
Examples of these ICs are depicted in Fig.14, where the solid curves are the debtholders’
ICs and the dashed curves are those of the equityholders. The equityholders and the
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debtholders are better oﬀ with lower and higher ICs, respectively. The turning point
in the debtholders’ ICs is where the value of their holding is maximised for given levels
of θ.15 The diagram shows the tangency points of the ICs to be at A = F . There is a
continuum of such Pareto eﬃcient equilibria, and the choice of the final outcome depends
on the relative bargaining power of the stakeholders. With full bargaining power the
debtholders optimise at DDEST = VT , attained by the choices (A
∗, θ∗) = (F, 1), as stated
in Proposition 3. On the other hand if the equityholders had the full bargaining power,
it would result in DDEST being driven down to the debtholders’ outside option, which is
default without DES when they would receive βVT . Note that this minimum value for
the debtholders ensures that θ∗ ≥ β for all cases of DES.
In reality, however, we observe partial forgiveness A < F . In order to achieve this we
introduce a cost term C (θ) for the debtholders of higher control of the firm, with C 0 > 0,
C 00 > 0, C (0) = 0 and limθ→1C (θ) = ∞. This reflects the bondholders’ reluctance to
take over the firm.16 Here, we let C (θ) = kθ
1−θ for some constant k > 0. We will see
below that he inclusion of the cost term results in the debtholders choosing an outcome
that is less than the socially optimal. The debtholders’ value under DES is now,
DDEST = βVT+(θ − β)VTN (d1 ((F −A) ers))+(1− θ) (F −A)N (d2 ((F −A) ers))−
kθ
1− θ ,
(30)
We define the admissibility of a DES under full debtholder bargaining power as follows:
15For example for θ = 0.1, the maximum value for the debtholders is that of the IC tangent to the
horizontal line θ = 0.1. On the diagram this is shown to be DDEST = 57.27.
16Bondholders may not be interested in taking over banks/companies, because, not only they lack
the company and industry expertise and know-how of shareholders, but also their mandate to invest in
low yielding, low volatile instruments may mean that they would be forced to sell their equity position.
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Definition 4 (DES Admissibility) The DES structure is admissible if the parame-
ters (A∗, θ∗, s∗) maximise the value of debtholders’ holding:
(A∗, θ∗, s∗) = argmax
A,θ,s
DDEST subject to D
DES
T ≥ βVT (31)
where A ∈ [0, F ], θ ∈ [0, 1] and s ≥ 0, and DTDES is given by Eq.(30).17
This problem can be solved in two stages: first, find the optimal (A∗, θ∗) given s, and
second, find s∗ with the maximum DDEST . In focussing on the first stage, the first-order
conditions are:
∂DDEST
∂θ = VTN (d1)− (F −A)N (d2)−
k
(1−θ)2 = 0
∂DDEST
∂A =
(1−β)
σ
√
s N
0 (d2)− (1− θ)N (d2) = 0.
Solving the simultaneous equations yields the optimal A∗ as the solution to,
VTN (d1 ((F −A) ers))−(F −A)N (d2 ((F −A) ers))−
kσ2s
(1− β)2
∙
N (d2 ((F −A) ers))
N 0 (d2 ((F −A) ers))
¸2
= 0
(32)
17In their definition of admissibility, MN has the condition that the received portion of equity exactly
covers the amount of the face value of the debt forgiven,
A = e−rs bET hθ [VS − (F −A) ers]χVS≥(F−A)ersi
= θ [VTN (d1 ((F −A) ers))− (F −A)N (d2 ((F −A) ers))] = f (A, s) .
They argue that this condition may be viewed as an equilibrium condition: for debtholders, the amount
A forgiven is the maximum for a given portion θ of equity received, while for equityholders, it is the
minimum amount acceptable. We believe that this is not the case. In their Table 1 they simulate the
optimal (A∗, s∗) for θ = 0.5 and diﬀerent values of β and VT . Then for β = 0.8 and VT = 30, their
admissible (A∗, s∗) are computed as (1.25, 2.48). In this case f (1.25, 2.48) = 1.25, i.e. the PV of
the equity received (in their set-up - see footnote 12) equals the forgiven amount, as assumed. Then
DDEST = 24.07 + 1.25 = 25.32, where 24.07 is the PV of the restructured bond. However for A = 7.04,
it can be computed that f (7.04, 2.48) = 2.25 and DDEST = 23.27 + 2.25 = 25.52. In other words, the
debtholders are able to increase their value by forgiving A higher than the PV of the equity received.
The equityholders are also better oﬀ as EDEST increases from 1.25 to 2.25, and this is therefore a Pareto-
improving agreement. As such, MN’s admissibility condition does not yield a Pareto eﬃcient outcome.
Intuitively, by increasing A the debtholders are able to increase the value of their equity holding more
than the loss in the value of the remaining debt.
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and θ∗ given by,
θ∗ = 1− (1− β)N (d2 ((F −A) e
rs))
σ
√
sN 0 (d2 ((F −A) ers))
< 1. (33)
Then A = F can no longer be the solution as the the last term goes to ∞ in Eq.(32).
Compare now this DES scheme with the CoCo bail-in structure. To do so, we
introduce future default risk at time S in our CoCo set-up. We assume the following
for simplicity: (i) when the CoCo bonds are partially (but not wholly) converted, i.e.
VT ∈
³
FB
1−E ,
F
1−τ
i
, then the remaining CoCo bonds are replaced by straight bonds of the
same face value; and (ii) when the firm is insolvent even after full CoCo conversion, i.e.
VT ∈ [0, FB), the regulator enforces DES to rescue the bank. Then the payoﬀs at S are,
VT range VS range and the payoﬀs
A :
¡
F
1−τ ,∞
¤ VS ≥ Fers : DS = Fers, ES = VS − Fers
VS < Fers : DS = βVS, ES = 0
B :
³
FB
1−E ,
F
1−τ
i VS ≥ (1−E)VTers : DS = (1−E)VTers + E−τE [VS − (1−E)VTers]ES = τE [VS − (1−E)VTers]
VS < (1−E)VTers : DS = βVS, ES = 0
C :
h
FB
1−τ ,
FB
1−E
i VS ≥ FBers : DS = FBers + (1−τ)VT−FBVT−FB (VS − FBers)ES = τVTVT−FB (VS − FBers)
VS < FBers : DS = βVS, ES = 0
D :
£
FB, FB1−τ
¢ VS ≥ FBers : DS = FBers, ES = VS − FBers
VS < FBers : DS = βVS, ES = 0
E : [0, FB)
VS ≥ (FB −A) ers :
DS = (FB −A) ers + θ [VS − (FB −A) ers]
ES = (1− θ) [VS − (FB −A) ers]
VS < (FB −A) ers : DS = βVS, ES = 0.
(34)
Each range of VT represents the following cases as described in detail in Appendix
A.3: A, no CoCo trigger; B, partial CoCo trigger; C, full CoCo triggered; D, remaining
equity written down; and E, the firm is insolvent. Then,
Proposition 5 CoCo bond bail-in is a non-admissible DES.
Proof. Compare the CoCo payoﬀ for the debtholders in Table (34) with that of DES
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Figure 15: PV at T for Debtholders and Equityholders: F = 90, FC = 20, r = 6%,
σ = 20%, s = 2 years, β = 0.7, k = 1, τ = 7% and E = 10%.
in Table (23). The two are equivalent for the two end cases of VT ≥ F1−τ (no bail-in
/ no DES) and VT < FB (DES in both). When FB1−E ≤ VT <
F
1−τ , the DES payoﬀ is
equivalent to the CoCo payoﬀ when A = F − (1− E)VT and θ = E−τE . Similarly when
FB
1−τ ≤ VT ≤
FB
1−E , the two are equivalent when A = FC and θ =
(1−τ)VT−FB
VT−FB . Finally
when FB ≤ VT < FB1−τ , the two payoﬀs are equal when A = FC and θ = 0. This means
that the CoCo payoﬀ is within the (unconstrained) feasible set of possible DESs, but for
FB ≤ VT < FB1−τ , it gives the debtholders zero value, which is below their outside option
of βVT . Hence the CoCo payoﬀs cannot be the admissible DES.
Basically, in contrast to the DES, in CoCo bail-in the bondholders are unable to
negotiate A or θ as these are both pre-defined at the CoCo bond inception. Note the
Writedown bond is the worst case scenario where A and θ are pre-set at (F, 0).
Fig.15 graphs the present values (PV ) at T of the stakeholders’ payoﬀs for both
admissible DES and CoCo structures. The regions A to E are those specified in Table
(34). The admissible DES PV is simulated by solving Eq.(32) numerically for the
optimal A∗ for each VT , which is then substituted in Eq.(33) to compute θ∗. As shown,
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the debtholders are able to attain higher values by their choice of A and θ than under
the CoCo structure. For the equityholders their PV is higher under CoCo than under
DES, with the diﬀerence again represented by a condor-like structure. This again implies
higher vega and lower delta for the CoCo structure than with the DES at and above the
trigger point. We therefore conclude that wealth-transfer and value destruction agency
costs are higher under CoCo bail-in than for a traditional DES.
6. Case Study: Banca Monte dei Paschi, 2013
In Section 4, we established that the introduction of CoCo or Writedown bail-in would
aggravate the value destruction agency cost by incentivising banks to opt for investments
which have high volatility but low present value. Under the standard Capital Asset
Pricing Model framework, this “gamble-for-resurrection” means an investment away
from the Capital Market Line that represents the eﬃcient trade-oﬀ between returns and
volatility. In practical terms this results in the lowering of the Sharpe Ratio of the
investment portfolio. Here we outline one such case of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena
(BMPS). The world’s oldest surviving bank was bailed out by the Italian government
in 2013, on account of, amongst many things, their flawed investment in BTPs (Italian
Sovereign Bonds) that took place through their Santorini vehicle during 2010. As we
discuss below, we see this as a “gamble-for-ressurection” that did not pay oﬀ, which, in
turn, was attempted as a result of losses from earlier trades.
In Fig.16 we plot some of the listed equity investments of BMPS between 2003-
2010.18 Through the cycle, the portfolio risk-return profile is balanced with the average
18This is limited to listed equity investments as there is no disclosure on fixed income investments.
The proxy market portfolio constitutes of an equally weighted allocation between European and Fixed
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Figure 16: BMPS Investments, 2003-2010. Source: Bloomberg, BMPS Annual Accounts
Sharpe Ratio of 1.0, albeit with a significant dispersion. Due to the 2008 financial crisis,
the Intesa San Paolo equity investment loss (€375mn) emerged in 2010. Consequently,
BMPS entered into an agreement with Deutsche Bank that involved, amongst other
things, the purchase of €2.75bn BTPs. We suspect that the bank was hoping to plug
in their deficit hole by targeting above 12-13% return in the BTPs bet. A 40% fall in
the Sharpe Ratio between their initial investment portfolio and the BTPs investment
highlights the highly risky profile of this bet.
AXA 0.5x
EDI 1.1x
LSE 1.2x
SNIA 1.0x
TEL. ITALIA 0.2x
VISA 1.3x
SORIN 1.5x
Average 1.0x
BTP 0.6x
Using 10 YR German Bund Yearly Returns  
Through the 2003‐2010 Cycle Sharpe Ratio
2010 BTP Targeted Sharpe Ratio
Sharpe Ratios
Income Equities, Risk Free Asset (Bund) and Gold.
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Figure 17: BTP Distribution, 2010. Source: Bloomberg
Moreover, BTPs were (and still are) volatile investment with annualised standard devi-
ation of 15% through the cycle, and thus the volatility adjusted return ratio was very
poor as shown below.
2010 BTP  Performance BTP Through the Cycle Performance
Return 6.6% Return 0.0%
Vol 15.0% Vol 14.6%
RFA Return 39.7% RFA Return 1.1%
Sharpe Ratio (excl RFA) ‐2.2x Sharpe Ratio (excl RFA) ‐0.1x
Vol Adjusted Return Ratio 0.4x Vol Adjusted Return Ratio 0.0x
Skewness ‐1.11 Skewness ‐1.35
Kurtosis 12.9 Kurtosis 11.4
BTP Performance
Further, the Gaussian distribution of the daily price change of BTP through 2010 dis-
plays negative skewness and fat tails (kurtosis of more than 3.5) as shown in Fig.17.
However this did not seem to dissuade BMPS from investing in this speculative trade.
It seems that BMPS thought that the rise in the BTP yields throughout 2008-9 would
retrace back to the pre-crisis 3% level. It did not happen, and once Italy was engulfed
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Figure 18: 10 year BTP Yield. Source: Bloomberg
by the sovereign crisis the BTP yields surged to above 7% (Fig.18). As a consequence
the speculative bet brought down the bank, which was finally bailed out by the Ital-
ian government. We view this as an example of “gamble-for-resurrection” which led
the bank to pursue low Sharpe Ratio investments in order to survive. This paper has
shown that the incentive problem will not be diﬀerent between this government bail-out
structure and the more recent CoCo bail-in structures.19 The put that was “sold” by
the government in the past is now sold by the creditors; this is just a swap of ultimate
bank rescuers from the taxpayers to the bondholders. The point is that the problem has
not been eradicated; in the process, the moral hazard problem has been replaced by the
agency costs, as analysed extensively in this paper.
19It is very plausible that the incentive problem will be higher under CoCo bail-in since bondholders,
and not taxpayers will prop up the bank, which mitigates the negative knock on impact on the bank’s
franchise.
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7. Concluding Remarks
The new financial regulation has been articulated to dampen moral hazard and to min-
imise the chances of another financial crisis that could jeopardise again the integrity of
the banking system. However in reality, the regulator is “swapping” bail-out for bail-
in, which, as discussed in this paper, is in essence a replacement of moral hazard with
agency costs. If the burden of an ailing bank fell to the taxpayers in the past, it will now
fall to the bondholders who will be required to be very mindful about the investments
they own in a bank. Historically, apart from the very few cases where the bank was
fully nationalised (e.g. Bankia in 2012; SNS in 2013), the equityholders would simply
suﬀer dilution (e.g. Lloyds and ING, both in 2008), or, in many cases, were unaﬀected
with the injection of new equity in the form of preference shares with CT1 qualification
(Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, etc.). Under the new bail-in regime, the equityholders
take the first losses up to the CoCo trigger point where bondholders get writtendown/oﬀ
or converted into a non-admissible DES, whilst there is still at least 7.0% of assets in
equity. This going-concern DAPR accentuates the agency costs that the bail-in structure
is introducing into the banking industry.
It is, moreover, possible that the new bail-in structure may even aggravate the moral
hazard problem. One could argue that the equityholders have more incentives to “gam-
ble for resurrection” when the wealth extraction comes from other investors (creditors)
rather than taxpayers, as the media scrutiny, and hence the reputational impact, would
likely be lower. Further, bail-in may not result in restrictions on dividends or bankers’
compensations as there would be with taxpayer bail-out. Whilst these are issues not
analysed in this paper, they enhance our case that the new financial regulation may not
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alleviate the incentive problems as aimed.
Traditional Corporate Finance literature has underscored the detrimental eﬀects of
agency costs on the relationships between bondholders and equityholders, especially due
to the limited investment of the latter. Higher equity advocated by some (e.g. Admati
et al., 2013) does not attenuate the problem when the equityholders enjoy the implicit
put of the bail-in-able balance sheet. Higher capital costs on risky investments (Risk-
Weighted Asset inflation) could potentially make banks safer, but banks are volatile
institutions with Non-Performing Loans and speculative trading that makes the busi-
ness unpredictable. Equityholders are aware of this and they will exploit the opportunity
to deviate from the Capital Asset Line in the Capital Asset Pricing Model, pursuing low
Sharpe Ratio “bets” and speculate with the DAPR oﬀered by the bondholders’ put.
The aggravation of this agency cost will trespass the bank’s balance sheet to penetrate
into the asset management industry (as the major owners of the bank’s debt), and ulti-
mately into the real economy. This latter point will be explored in detail in subsequent
papers. In this paper we focussed on several aspects that arise from our view within
this new bail-in world. Wealth-transfer and value destruction are two consequences of
the dominance of equityholders in their private “game” against bondholders. This is
even more pronounced when bondholders do not have the chance to steer the restruc-
turing to attain a fair agreement that partially compensates their losses, as would do in
an admissible DES. To conclude, the new regulations do not tackle the intrinsic moral
hazard of the banking industry; instead they are “solutions” that yield new unintended
consequences. Unfortunately the inherent problems continue to lurk behind the scenes
of an industry.
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Appendix
A. Derivations of the Payoﬀs
A.1. No Bail-out / Bail-in
The long call option of the equityholders and the short put position of the debtholders,
both at strike price F , lead to the following payoﬀs for the stakeholders,
VT [0, F ) [F,F +E) [F +E,∞]
D VT F F
E 0 VT−F VT−F
Total Firm VT VT VT
Notes Capital wiped out, debt write down Capital write down No write down
The summary payoﬀs are as given in Eq.(1). For example in the case that F = 90,
the payoﬀs for diﬀerent values of VT are,
VT 80.0 82.5 85.0 87.5 90.0 92.5 95.0 97.5 100.0 102.5 105.0
D 80.0 82.5 85.0 87.5 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0
E 0 0 0 0 0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0
Total Firm 80.0 82.5 85.0 87.5 90.0 92.5 95.0 97.5 100.0 102.5 105.0
This is depicted in Fig.1.
A.2. Government Bail-Out
As described in the main text the government bails out the bank to restore its balance
sheet, such that its minimum capital ratio E is maintained. The debtholders are fully
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protected at their face value F , leading to a balance sheet floor of F
1−E . When VT is
below this level the bail-out is triggered, with an injection of preference shares by the
government. For values of VT below F+ F1−EEC, the government also ensures a minimum
common equity floor of EC, with the taxpayers providing VT −
³
F + F
1−EEC
´
to prop up
both the equityholders’ common equity and the debtholders’ holdings. The stakeholders’
payoﬀs at T are then, where EC is the common equity held by the equityholders and
EP is the preference shares owned by the government,
VT
h
0, F+ F1−EEC
´ h
F+ F1−EEC ,
F
1−E
´ h
F
1−E , F +E0
´
[F +E0,∞]
D F F F F
EC F1−EEC VT−F VT−F VT−F
EP
¡
E −EC
¢ F
1−E
F
1−E−VT 0 0
Total Firm F1−E
F
1−E VT VT
Tax payers −
h³
F+ F1−EEC
´
−VT
i
0 0 0
Capital ratio E E
h
E, E0F+E0
i h
E0
F+E0
,∞
i
Common
equity ratio
EC
£
EC , E
¤ h
E, E0F+E0
i h
E0
F+E0
,∞
i
Notes
Bail-out to attain
minimum capital ratio and
minimum common equity
Bail-out to
attain minimum
capital ratio
Equity capital
write down
No write
down
The payoﬀs are summarised in Eq.(4).
Consider for example the outcome VT = 85. Assume that the minimum capital ratio
of E = 10%, and the minimum common equity floor of EC = 5%. With F = 90, in
the absence of a bail-out the equityholders are wiped out, while the bondholders also
lose 5. With the bail-out the government provides 15 to restore the balance sheet to
90
1−0.10 = 100. The bondholders receive 5 of this and the equityholders receive 5. The
government ends up with 5 of the preference shares to ensure the capital ratio of 10%,
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resulting in the net cost of −10 to the taxpayers. This and other examples are given
below:
VT 85.0 87.5 90.0 92.5 95.0 97.5 100.0 102.5 105.0
D 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0
EC 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0
EP 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 2.5 0 0 0
Total Firm 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 102.5 105.0
Tax payers −10.0 −7.5 −5.0 −2.5 0 0 0 0 0
Capital ratio 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 12.2% 14.3%
Common
equity ratio
5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 7.5% 10.0% 12.2% 14.3%
The payoﬀ graphs are depicted in Fig.2.
A.3. Bail-in with CoCo Bonds
As explained, the bail-in triggers when VT−FVT ≤ τ ⇔ VT ≤
F
1−τ , which ensures the
minimum capital ratio E. This is done by converting FC − [(1− E)VT − FB] of the
CoCo bond into ED = (E − τ)VT of equity held by the debtholders, resulting in their
loss of F − (1− τ)VT . For VT below FB1−E , all of the CoCo bond is used up and hence E
is not attainable, though the equityholders still hold equity level of τVT . For VT below
FB
1−τ , even this is not attainable and the equityholders’ holding is written down. Finally
when VT < FB, with the capital totally wiped out, the debtholders become the residual
claimants. The payoﬀs are thus,
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VT [0, FB)
h
FB, FB1−τ
´ h
FB
1−τ ,
FB
1−E
i ³
FB
1−E ,
F
1−τ
i ³
F
1−τ , F +E0
´
[F +E0,∞]
D VT FB FB FB FB FB
CoCo 0 0 0 (1−E)VT−FB FC FC
ED 0 0 (1−τ)VT−FB (E−τ)VT 0 0
EC 0 VT−FB τVT τVT VT − F VT − F
Total Debt VT FB (1− τ)VT (1− τ)VT F F
Total Firm VT VT VT VT VT VT
Capital
ratio
0 [0,τ ] [τ , E] E
h
τ , E0F+E0
i h
E0
F+E0
,∞
i
Notes
Capital
wiped out,
debt-holders
residual
claimants
Equity
capital
write
down
CoCo
wholly
triggered, E
unattainable
CoCo
partially
triggered
Equity
capital
write
down,
no trigger
No write
down
The summary payoﬀs are as given in Eq.(6).
As an example, consider the case where there are FB = 70 of the straight bond,
FC = 20 of the CoCo bond and the initial equity of E0 = 10. The minimum capital ratio
and the trigger point are again E = 10% and τ = 7%. For VT < FB+FC+E0 = 100, only
the equity capital is written down if VT > F1−τ =
90
1−0.07 = 96.77. Below this point CoCo
bail-in occurs. For example at VT = 80, the bail-in is triggered at the equity capital level
ofEC = VT×τ = 80×0.07 = 5.6. The equityholders therefore bear the first 10−5.6 = 4.4
of the total loss of 20 of the firm. The remaining 15.6 of the loss is bourne by the CoCo
bondholders, whose FC − [(1− E)VT − FB] = 20 − (0.9× 80− 70) = 18 of the CoCo
bond is converted into (E − τ)VT = (0.1− 0.07)× 80 = 2.4 of equity, held by the CoCo
bond holders. The total equity capital of EC+ED = 5.6+2.4 = 8 satisfies the minimum
capital ratio of E = 10%. The total position of the bondholders is 72 + 2.4 = 74.4.
This is shown below in the column for VT = 80. When VT = FB1−E =
70
1−0.1 = 77.78, the
46
trigger point of the equity capital is 77.78 × 0.07 = 5.44. To maintain E = 10%, the
firm has to reduce its total debt to 0.9 × 77.78 = 70 which equals the face value of its
straight bond. Thus the whole of CoCo bond is converted to (0.1− 0.07)×77.78 = 2.33
of the debtholders’ equity. For VT lower than FB1−τ =
70
1−0.07 = 75.27, according to the
absolute priority rule (APR) the equityholders’ remaining capital is written down to
below τ = 7%. For VT less than FB = 70 the firm becomes insolvent.
VT 70.0 75.0 75.27 77.78 80.0 85.0 90.0 95.0 96.77 97.5 100.0 105.0
D 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0
CoCo 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 6.5 11.0 15.5 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0
ED 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.33 2.4 2.55 2.7 2.85 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
EC 0.0 5.0 5.27 5.44 5.6 5.95 6.3 6.65 6.77 7.5 10.0 15.0
Total Debt 70.0 70.0 70.0 72.33 74.4 79.05 83.7 88.35 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0
Total Firm 70.0 75.0 75.0 77.78 80.0 85.0 90.0 95.0 96.77 97.5 100.0 105.0
Capital ratio 0% 6.7% 7.0% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 7.0% 7.7% 10% 14.3%
Fig.3 depicts these payoﬀs.
A.4. Bail-in with Writedown Bonds
For Writedown bonds, the bail-in triggers once VT−FVT ≤ τ ⇔ VT ≤
F
1−τ when the entire
Writedown bond is written down/oﬀ.
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VT [0, FB)
h
FB , F1−τ
i ³
F
1−τ , F
´
[F,∞]
D VT FB FB FB
FW 0 0 FW FW
EC 0 VT−FB VT−F VT−F
Total Debt VT FB F F
Total Firm VT VT VT VT
Notes
Capital wiped out,
debt written down
Writedown
triggered
Equity capital
written down,
no trigger
No write
down
The summary payoﬀs are given in Eq.(11).
As an example let there be FB = 70 of the straight bond, FW = 20 of the Writedown
bond and E = 20 of the initial equity capital. The minimum capital ratio and the trigger
point are again E = 10% and τ = 7%. The equity capital is then written down until VT
hits VT = 70+201−0.07 = 96.77. Below this point the bail-in is triggered and the entire 20 of
the Writedown bond is converted to equity and writtendown / oﬀ. There is, therefore, a
discontinuity at this point for the payoﬀs of both the debtholders and the equityholders.
VT 60.0 65.0 70.0 75.0 80.0 85.0 90.0 95.0 100.0 105.0
D 60.0 65.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0
FW 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 20.0
EC 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 10.0 15.0
Total Debt 60.0 65.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 90.0 90.0
Total Firm 60.0 65.0 70.0 75.0 80.0 85.0 90.0 95.0 100.0 105.0
Fig.6 shows the payoﬀs of this example.
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B. Proof of ∂∂K
£
N (−d1 (K))− λN
¡
−d1
¡K
λ
¢¢¤
< 0 for
V0 > Kλ
Noting that ∂∂KN (−d1 (K)) =
1
Kσ
√
T
N 0 (−d1 (K)),
∂
∂K
∙
N (−d1 (K))− λN
µ
−d1
µ
K
λ
¶¶¸
=
1
Kσ
√
T
∙
N 0 (−d1 (K))− λN 0
µ
−d1
µ
K
λ
¶¶¸
.
This is negative if and only if,
exp
µ
−d
2
1 (K)
2
¶
< λ exp
Ã
−
d21
¡
K
λ
¢
2
!
⇔ d21 (K) > d21
µ
K
λ
¶
− 2 lnλ.
Now d1
¡
K
λ
¢
= d1 (K) + lnλσ√T and hence,
⇔ d21 (K) > d21 (K) +
2 lnλ
σ
√
T
d1 (K) +
(lnλ)2
σ2T
− 2 lnλ
⇔ 0 > lnλ
σ
√
T
∙
2
³
d1 (K)− σ
√
T
´
+
lnλ
σ
√
T
¸
.
As d1 (K)− σ
√
T = d2 (K) and when 0 < λ < 1, lnλ < 0,
⇔ 0 < d2 (K) +
lnλ
2σ
√
T
= d2 (K) +
lnλ
σ
√
T
− lnλ
2σ
√
T
= d2
µ
K
λ
¶
− lnλ
2σ
√
T
⇔ lnλ
2σ
√
T
< d2
µ
K
λ
¶
.
For 0 < λ < 1 then the suﬃcient condition is that d2
¡
K
λ
¢
> 0 ⇔ V0 > Kλ exp
−

r−σ2
2

T ,
which in turn is suﬃciently satisfied for V0 > Kλ when r >
σ2
2
.
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C. Proof of Eq.(22) being Negative
First note that, at FW = 0, ∆WDcdr = 0. Investigate what happens when FW increases
while keeping F constant,
∂
∂FW
∆WDcdr = −
e−rT
V0σ
√
T
N 0
µ
−d2
µ
F
1− τ
¶¶
+
1
FBσ
√
T
N 0 (−d1 (FB)) .
Now note the following property of the Black-Scholes put option pricing formula:
P0 (K) = −S0N (−d1 (K))+Ke−rTN (−d2 (K))⇒ S0N 0 (−d1 (K)) = Ke−rTN 0 (−d2 (K)) .
Applying this here, ∂∂FW∆WDcdr < 0 if and only if,
µ
1− τ
F
¶
N 0
µ
−d1
µ
F
1− τ
¶¶
>
1
FB
N 0 (−d1 (FB)) .
Analyse this:
⇔ −
µ
d1
µ
F
1− τ
¶¶2
+ (d1 (FB))
2 > 2 ln
µ
F
1− τ
1
FB
¶
⇔
∙
ln
µ
V0
FB
¶¸2
−
∙
ln
µ
V0 (1− τ)
F
¶¸2
+ 2
µ
r +
σ2
2
¶
T ln
µ
F
1− τ
1
FB
¶
> 2σ2T ln
µ
F
1− τ
1
FB
¶
⇔
∙
ln
µ
V 20 (1− τ)
FBF
¶¸
+ 2
µ
r +
σ2
2
¶
T > 2σ2T
⇔ V0 >
µ
F
1− τ FB
¶1
2
e−

r−σ2
2

T .
This is certainly satisfied for V0 > F1−τ when r >
σ2
2
. Hence ∆WDcdr < 0 unambiguously
∀FW for V0 above the trigger point.
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D. CoCo Bond as Debt-to-Equity Swap
The present values at T of the payoﬀs described in (34) are,
VT range PV at T³
F
1−τ ,∞
i DT = e−rs bET £FersχVS≥Fers + βVSχVS<Fers¤
ET = e−rs bET £(VS − Fers)χVS≥Fers¤
³
FB
1−E ,
F
1−τ
i DT = e−rs bET hn(1−E)VT ers + E−τE [VS − (1−E)VT ers]oχVS≥(1−E)VT ers
+βVSχVS<(1−E)VT ers
i
ET = e−rs bET h τE [VS − (1−E)VT ers]χVS≥(1−E)VT ersih
FB
1−τ ,
FB
1−E
i DT = e−rs bET hnFBers + (1−τ)VT−FBVT−FB (VS − FBers)oχVS≥FBers + βVSχVS<FBersi
ET = e−rs bET h τVTVT−FB (VS − FBers)χVS≥FBersih
FB , FB1−τ
´ DT = e−rs bET £FBersχVS≥FBers + βVSχVS<FBers¤
ET = e−rs bET £(VS − FBers)χVS≥FBers¤
[0, FB)
DT = e−rs bET h{(FB −A) ers + θ [VS − (FB −A) ers]}χVS≥(FB−A)ers
+βVSχVS<(FB−A)ers
i
ET = e−rs bET h(1− θ) [VS − (FB −A) ers]χVS≥(FB−A)ersi.
These can be evaluated as the following:
VT range PV at T³
F
1−τ ,∞
i DT = βVTN (−d1 (Fers)) + FN (d2 (Fers))
ET = VTN (d1 (Fers))− FN (d2 (Fers))³
FB
1−E ,
F
1−τ
i DT = βVT + ³E−τE − β´VTN (d1 ((1−E)VT ers)) + τ(1−E)E VTN (d2 ((1−E)VT ers))
ET = τE [VTN (d1 ((1−E)VT ers))− (1−E)VTN (d2 ((1−E)VT ers))]h
FB
1−τ ,
FB
1−E
i DT = βVT + h (1−τ)VT−FBVT−FB − βiVTN (d1 (FBers)) + τVTVT−FBFBN (d2 (FBers))
ET = τVTVT−FB [VTN (d1 (FBe
rs))− FBN (d2 (FBers))]h
FB , FB1−τ
´ DT = βVTN (−d1 (FBers)) + FBN (d2 (FBers))
ET = VTN (d1 (FBers))− FBN (d2 (FBers))
[0, FB)
DT = βVT + (θ − β)VTN (d1 ((FB −A) ers)) + (1− θ) (FB −A)N (d2 ((FB −A) ers))
ET = (1− θ) [VTN (d1 ((FB −A) ers))− (FB −A)N (d2 ((FB −A) ers))] .
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